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INTRODUCTION
In the past 25 years or so, the issue of ethical universalizability has
figured prominently in theoretical as well as practical ethics. The term,
‘universalizability’ used in connection with ethical considerations, was
apparently first introduced in the mid-1950s by R. M. Hare to refer to
what he characterized as a logical thesis about certain sorts of evaluative sentences (Hare, 1955). The term has since been used to cover a
broad variety of ethical considerations including those associated with
the ideas of impartiality, consistency, justice, equality, and reversibility as well as those raised in the familar questions: ‘What if everyone
did that?’ and ‘How would you like it if someone did that to you?’
But this recent effloresence of the use of the term ‘universalizability’
is something that has deep historical roots, and has been central in
various forms to the thinking about morality of some of the greatest
and most influential philosophers in the western tradition. While the
term is relatively new, the ideas it is now used to express have a long
history. Most of these ideas and questions have been or can be formulated into a principle to be discussed, criticized, or defended. As we
discuss these ideas below this principle will be stated on a separate
numbered line.
The concepts of justice and equality were closely linked in Greek
thought. These connections between these two concepts are apparent
even in two authors who were hostile to the connection, Plato and Aristotle. They attempted to defuse the connection by emphasizing that
justice or equality requires treating unequals unequally (see Vlastos,
1973). Aristotle writes:
Now if the unjust is unequal, the just must be equal; and that is, in fact,
what everyone believes without argument ... the just involves at least
four terms: there are two persons in whose eyes it is just, and the shares
which are just are two. Also, there will be the same equality between
the persons and the shares; the ratio between the shares will be the
same as that between the persons. If the persons are not equal, their
[just I shares will not be equal; but this is the source of quarrels and
recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares or
unequals equal shares.1

This discussion could be condensed into the following principle.
(1)

Treat equals equally, unequals unequally.
ix
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Jesus in the New Testament gives an influential statement of what has
long been called the “Golden Rule,” but which is more often discussed
by philosophers under the title of a moral principle of reversibility:
(2)

Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.

There seem to be problems with the Golden Rule when we attempt
to use it to determine what our obligations in specific circumstances
are. It is because of these difficulties that, as is remarked below, philosophers, when they get their hands on this principle tend to turn it into
a non-substantive principle (see Singer, 1963; Gewirth, 1978). Another
course is followed by Narveson in the lead essay of this anthology,
who considers its claims as a moral principle in a variety of different
formulations and rejects them all. Apart from such specific difficulties,
part of the basic insight of the Golden Rule remains alive in those philosophers such as Kurt Baier who make significant use of such related
notions as reversibility or reciprocity.
One of the most influential of moral philosophers ever, Immanuel
Kant, proposed several different formulations of what he called “the
categorical imperative.” And he called the categorical imperative the
“supreme principle of morality.” This latter phrase apparently means
that he believed that this principle was the only moral principle needed
to determine our moral obligations in any particular circumstance (i.e.,
with reference to any given maxim). Other statements used in arriving
at such conclusions about our moral obligations would be one and all
non-moral statements. According to this view, any other correct moral
principles or rules, such as “Don’t tell lies,” or “Be beneficent,” would
be a subsidiary principle or rule arrived at using only a single moral
principle, the categorical imperative itself. What is often called the
“first formulation” of the categorical imperative is a version of what
we will shortly be referring to as a substantive universalizability principle. Here are two different statements of it:
(3)
(4)

Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.
Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through
your will a universal law of nature (Kant, 1785, AK., IV, 421).

The differences between these two versions are important for its application, but for our present purposes we may refer to either statement indifferently as versions of what we will call, following the usual
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practice, the “first formulation” of the categorical imperative. Both
versions contain the key phrase “universal law” which makes it clear
that Kant’s attempt is to use a substantive universalizability principle
as the basis of his entire moral theory. This is the most ambitious claim
ever made for a principle of ethical universalizability.
Henry Sidgwick, writing about a century ago, kept a notion of universalizability alive within the utilitarian tradition:
(5)

[I]f a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not
right (or wrong) for someone else, it must be on the ground of
some difference between the two cases, other than the fact
that I and he are different persons (Sidgwick, 1901, p. 379).

Another formulation which seems likely to yield quite similar results to Sidgwick’s principle is one that has been mentioned by more
than one recent writer; here it is given in a formulation from a recent
book by an author who is a contributor to the present volume, Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz:
(6)

Moral properties of things (persons, actions, states of affairs,
situations) are essentially independent of their purely ‘individual’ or ‘numerical’ aspects (Rabinowicz, 1979, p. 11).

Another direction has been taken by another much discussed writer
who also contributes to this volume, Marcus Singer:
(7)

If the consequences of everyone’s doing some action x would be
undesirable, then no one ought to do x (Singer, 1961, p. 66).

In another recent influential essay Bernard Williams imagines a
world in which we have the power to control, alter, and improve all of
people’s personal qualities to the point where each is brought up to the
level of all the others in qualifications. He writes,
In these circumstances, where everything about a person is controllable, equality of opportunity and absolute equality seem to coincide;
and this itself illustrates something about the notion of equality of opportunity (Williams, 1962, pp. 128-9).

The idea of absolute equality appears to be one of the more radical
theses that a concept of universalizability could yield: the idea that all
persons should be treated in exactly the same way period.2 Such an
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idea has had few if any defenders, but as the present quotation from
Williams indicates, its existence as a possible ideal may be used to help
clarify by contrast other related conceptions. Williams’ thought may
be formulated in the following principle:
(8)

Where all differences between persons are controllable, equality of opportunity and absolute equality coincide.

The connections with universalizability are also clear in the statement of the first part of John Rawls’ principle of justice:
(9)

[E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others
(Rawls, 1971, p. 60).

The connections with universalizability are to be found in the words
“equal” and “similar.”
The above nine principles aim to represent both the history and the
possible scope of concepts of ethical universalizability. There are some
who think that it is not a single concept that has such a scope, but
at best a family of concepts that exhibit family resemblance, and at
worst a miscellaneous assortment of ideas arising from various puns
on key words such as “equal” and “universal.” And we wish to regard
these questions about the unity of the concept of universalizability and
about the importance or soundness of the concept in its applications
(the Nakhnikian issue) as open ones.
Singer, though not exactly a “sceptic” in either of the senses just
specified, remarks in his paper below that not only has ‘universalizability’ been used to cover a variety of distinct theses, but ’... the ...
term has been so promiscuously generalized as to cover a variety of
only tenuously related matters.’
These points raise questions about the connections, however tenuous, among these principles, which in turn raise more fundamental
questions about their meaning, justification, and application. The papers contained in this anthology represent some of the most recent
thinking about these fundamental questions regarding universalizability principles and related matters. In editing this volume, we have
sought to arrange the papers according to what seems to us as a helpful way of distinguishing among types of universalizability principles.
In what follows, we shall introduce our scheme of organization and
explain how the papers fit into this scheme.
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We have found it convenient to classify universalizability principles
of the sort listed above according to whether they are non-substantive
or substantive. What we mean in calling a principle ‘non-substantive’
is, roughly, that such a principle does not entail, either alone or together with other non-moral premises, any moral conclusions of the
sort that something (some action, person, state of affairs) has a certain
moral property. Rather, it is only in connection with a moral Judgment
or statement to the effect that a thing of a certain sort has a certain
moral property that a non-substantive principle can be used to derive
any moral conclusions. By contrast, a ‘substantive’ ethical principle is
one which, either alone or together with other non-moral premises,
can be used to derive moral conclusions.
This distinction between non-substantive and substantive moral
principles is the basis for what seems to be a main division between
two types of universalizability principles. Thus, the so-called ‘principle of universalizability,’ alternatively expressed by the first two principles on the above list, is typically interpreted as a principle of ethical
consistency, which as one author has put it: ‘may be seen as a purely
hypothetical thesis. According to it, a certain moral claim applies to an
object only if similar moral claims apply to similar moral objects’ (Rabinowicz, 1979, p. 14). The idea is that in order to derive a moral claim
about (for example) the moral quality of some action in a certain situation, this principle must be taken in conjunction with a moral claim
about the possession of the same moral quality by a similar action in a
similar situation. By contrast, substantive universalizability principles,
such as Kant’s categorical imperative and Marcus Singer’s generalization argument, are not hypothetical in this sense; rather they set forth
a standard or test for determining in connection with other non-moral
information, the moral acceptability of something. In the case of the
categorical imperative, those actions whose maxims cannot be willed
consistently as universal laws of nature are unacceptable. The generalization argument on the other hand (If the consequences of everyone’s
doing some action x would be undesirable then no one ought to do x
without a reason) sets forth a standard forbidding those actions the
general doing of which would produce undesirable consequences.
Reflection on important differences between the principles of Kant
and Singer in particular, and on the differences between two of the
main normative ethical traditions in general, viz., the Kantian and
utilitarian traditions, suggests a further subdivision within the class
of substantive universalizability principles. Thus, if we use the term,
‘consequentialist’, in a general way to denote not only utilitarian prin-
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ciples, but also those associated, though strictly speaking non-utilitarian, principles,3 then we can distinguish between Kantian and consequentialist universalizability principles.
Of course, this scheme for dividing universalizability principles is
only intended to provide a rough means for classifying such principles, one which though useful, does not seem to make mutually exclusive divisions. For example, Jonathan Harrison, in his contribution to
this volume, seems to be proposing a consequentialist moral theory,
though one incorporating considerations of Kantian universalizability. Moreover, some principles are not clearly classifiable as either substantive or non-substantive, e.g., the Golden Rule. In its most common
formulation ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,’
it appears to set forth a test or criterion for morally acceptable action.
Gewirth has put it this way. ‘This criterion consists in the agent’s desires or wishes for himself qua recipient: what determines the moral
rightness of a transaction initiated or controlled by some person is
whether he would himself want to undergo such a transaction at the
hands of another’ (Gewirth, 1978, p. 133).
Now the problems with the Golden Rule so interpreted have been
recorded many times, going back at least as far as Kant (see Kant, 1785,
AK, IV, 430n). In attempting to preserve the spirit of this principle, if
not the letter, many philosophers have sought to find an acceptable
formulation of the rule. And what is interesting is that some, though
not all, of these attempts have in effect transformed it from an apparently substantive principle into a non-substantive principle (see Singer, 1963, and Blackstone, 1965).
With these points in mind, let us turn to some of the specific issues
that have been raised in connection with each of these types of universalizability principles and briefly indicate how the papers in this
collection are related to such issues as well as to each other.
ETHICAL UNIVERSALIZABILITY: A VARIETY OF THESES
We placed Jan Narveson’s paper at the head of the anthology because it provides a broad survey of some of the main theses that have
been discussed or might be discussed under the title of ‘universalizability.’ This survey to some extent cuts across the distinctions embodied in the arrangement of the rest of the essays in the present volume,
so that there is scarcely another single appropriate place for it in our
table of contents. It also provides an excellent introduction to the present state of discussions of universalizability. The range of Narveson’s
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discussion is great, emphasizing a point we have already made in this
introduction, that the term ‘universalizability’ is today used to cover
quite a large family of ideas. Some of these theses when they are considered as the only contribution that the concept of universalizability
has to make to morality, make the contribution of that concept rather
peripheral. Others, when considered by themselves, make universalizability to be close to the essence of morality. After taking us on a tour
of some of the more peripheral conceptions, Narveson zeroes in on
some of the more important conceptions, the ones in which he finds
himself the most interested.
In the course of his discussion he criticizes certain formulations of
the Golden Rule and other reversibility criteria as causing problems
seemingly no matter how they are formulated. He does not distinguish
sharply between U-formulations that are utilitarian or consequentialist and those that are not. In fact it is an interesting surprise to find this
well-known defender and explicator of utilitarianism to be indicating
some doubts about certain aspects of utilitarianism (see especially note
31) and to be defending the view that universalizability is close to the
essence of morality. His final formulation is:
U16
		
		
		

R is an acceptable moral rule only if there is sufficient reason in terms of their own values, for all
moral agents who have reason to decline the
ruleless state to accept R.

The qualification referring to those who “have reason to decline the
ruleness state,” would omit or exclude only those who prefer or at
least have no reason on balance to reject the Hobbesian state of nature.
Fortunately such a person would be both rare and unusual. Apart from
this exclusion, which we have every reason to expect is insignificant,
the point is that there are certain rules which everyone will have an
interest in everyone’s following. Such a skeleton of rules for social relations, if they are fairly well in place, can give us assurance in dealing
with others. Many of these rules, as we may expect, would be negative
rules of non-interference. And since U16 refers to “all moral agents,”
it puts aside golden rule issues about whether agent or patient preference should be followed.
U16 is then finally a principle that is not merely proposed abstractly
for our decision-making; it is instead based on a conception of what
morality is for (regulating the skeleton of all personal relations so that
individuals can within this structure accomplish their own goals). And
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it places one specific concept of universalizability at quite a central
location in the structure of morality.
UNIVERSALIZABILITY AND ETHICAL CONSISTENCY
If an action is right (or wrong) for one agent in a certain circumstance,
then it is right (or wrong) for any similar agent in similar circumstances.

This is one formulation of a non-substantive principle of ethical
universalizability that has been given various labels: the Principle of
Universalizability; the Generalization Principle; the Principle of Justice; the Principle of Impartiality; to mention the most common. In one
variant formulation or another, this principle enjoys widespread acceptance among moral philosophers despite the fact that there is not
widespread agreement about its meaning (and hence correct formulation); or about its justification (or how it should be “accounted for”);
or about its implications, not only in connection with practical moral
issues (i.e., concerning its practical application) but also in connection
with other moral principles. These and associated issues are taken up
in the papers by Singer, Rabinowicz, Nielsen, Olafson, Gorr, and Lycan
and are thus grouped together in the anthology. In order to indicate
how these authors approach these issues, it will be useful to provide
brief sketches of their articles (though we have refrained from engaging in detailed exegesis and criticism).
The paper by Marcus Singer, ‘Universalizability and the Generalization Principle,’ touches on a number of the above-mentioned issues
concerning this principle of ethical consistency. In particular, Singer
considers its justification and various criticisms that have been leveled
against it. The paper is divided into five sections. In Sections I and II,
Singer considers certain important theses advanced by R. M. Hare concerning the principle’s interpretation and justification. Hare prefers
the label ‘Principle of Universalizability’ for the principle in question,
and has argued on a number of occasions that, owing to important differences in meaning between ‘universal’ and ‘general,’ it is incorrect
and misleading to speak of ethical generalization, or to use the label
‘The Generalization Principle’ (Singer’s label) either for the principle
in question or for associated ideas in ethics. In the first section of this
paper Singer examines Hare’s arguments for this claim and, finding
them inconclusive, defends his use of ‘generalization’ for the idea and
principle in question.
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Hare has also advanced an account or explanation of the truth or
validity of the principle of universalizability. According to Hare, Singular moral judgments (e.g., ‘It is right (wrong, obligatory) for me to
tell the truth in these circumstances’) are universalizable in the sense
that they commit the person making the judgment to a corresponding
universal judgment (‘It is (right, wrong, obligatory) for anyone who is
relevantly similar to me in relevantly similar circumstances to tell the
truth’). The entailment relation between singular and universal moral
judgments holds because the principle of universalizability holds and
the truth or validity of this principle is to be explained by reference to
descriptive meaning rules that govern (at least in part) the meaning
of such singular judgments. The central idea is this. On Hare’s view,
singular moral judgments in which such evaluative terms as ‘right,’
‘wrong’, and ‘obligatory’ occur as predicates are analogous to ordinary singular descriptive judgments in which descriptive terms occur
as predicates (e.g., “This is red”). The meanings of such predicates
(both evaluative and descriptive) are governed by descriptive meaning rules-rules which, so Hare explains, “lay it down that we may apply an expression to objects which are similar to each other in certain
respects.” He adds, “It is a direct consequence of this that we cannot
without consistency apply a descriptive term to one thing, and refuse
to apply it to another similar thing (either exactly similar or similar
in the relevant respects)” (Hare, 1963, p. 13). So, on Hare’s view, the
universalizability of moral judgments (or the principle of ethical universalizability) is to be explained or justified in a way analogous to the
way the universalizability of singular descriptive judgments is to be
explained, viz. by appealing to descriptive meaning rules.
In Section II, Singer criticizes this account of the principle of universalizability, charging that it leads not only to triviality but “leads
[Hare] to move from his theoretical account of its basis—in descriptive
meaning rules—to otherwise sensible judgments inconsistent with the
original account.”
In Section III, then, Singer turns to ills own account of the validity
of this principle, reaffirming the view he offered in his Generalization
in Ethics, according to which it is the inferential character of singular
moral judgments—a feature that makes them analogous to “because”
judgments in general and to causal and probability judgments in particular—that accounts for the validity of the generalization principle.
Turning to Sections IV and V, Singer (Section IV) considers the use
Alan Gewirth has made of the generalization principle in the context
of his own moral theory. Gewirth attempts to deduce what he claims
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to be the supreme principle of morality—the so-called principle of generic consistency—in an argument one of whose premises is the generalization principle. Singer considers Gewirth’s use of the principle
and critically discusses some of the claims Gewirth has made about
the generalization principle, in particular that it is neither a substantial
nor a moral principle and that it “set no limits on the criteria of relevant similarity or the sufficient reasons for having the right to perform
various actions” (Gewirth, 1978, p. 106). Singer argues in the first place
that, when properly understood, this principle is both substantial and
moral (as well as being logical) and furthermore, that “when properly
understood [it] illuminates the concept of a genuine moral reason and
what can count as one and what cannot, and shows that it is not open
to anyone to invoke its form in justification of what is unjustified.”
Section V again takes up and considers further the criticism that the
generalization principle sets no limits on what can count as a genuine
moral reason.
The above formulation of a universalizability principle with which
we began our discussion of the papers in this section makes reference
to the notion of similarity. In fact, this notion which is absolutely crucial in this and related principles, admits of two different interpretations, one in terms of exact similarity, and the other in terms of relevant
similarity. Each has special problems. The problem with the exact
similarity formulation is that together with the Leibnizian thesis that
indiscernability (exact similarity) entails identity, the principle turns
out to be trivial. That is, together with Leibniz’s principle, the ethical
principle of universalizability thus interpreted reduces to: If an action
is right (or wrong) for one agent, then it is right (or wrong) for that
agent. On the other hand, the relevant similarities variant of the principle encounters the vexing (and, according to some, insurmountable)
problem that the notion of relevance is unclear. Thus, we have what
Rabinowicz calls the ‘universalizability dilemma’: embracing either of
the only two alternative formulations seems unacceptable.
Rabinowicz’s paper, ‘The Universalizability Dilemma,’ offers a way
out of the dilemma. Making use of set-theoretic models and defining
the principle of universalizability as a condition on a model, Rabinowicz employs, in addition to the concepts of exact similarity (copyhood)
and relevant similarity, the concept of a universal aspect of a situation.
Taking this newly introduced concept as primitive, Rabinowicz formulates a universalizability condition on a model that he claims is not
trivialized by the Leibnizian principle and does not make use of the
problematic concept of relevant similarity.
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In ‘Universalizability and the Commitment to Impartiality,’ Kai
Nielsen is concerned with the rationalist program of seeking ‘·the
foundations of justice and sometimes the whole of morality in an a
priori or formal principle of Universalizability.” Nielsen denies that this
program can be carried out and illustrates his claim by considering the
attempts to go from the principle of universalizability (either directly
or together with other considerations of logic and rationality) to an
impartiality principle of the following sort: ‘All human beings have an
equal right to the fulfillment of their interests.’
Nielsen begins by making the same distinctions we have seen in
Rabinowicz between the exact and the relevant similarity variants of
the principle of universalizability. Working with the latter variant,
Nielsen points out its two important limitations. First, it “does not
tell us what is right or wrong, good or bad, or what ought or ought not
be done. It says rather if one thing is right, good or ought to be done,
then another thing relevantly similar to it is too.” In other words, the
principle is non-substantive. Second, Nielsen claims that the principle
itself does not specify or set forth any criteria for determining what
counts as being relevantly similar from the moral point of view. So,
in order to go from the principle of universalizability to the principle
of impartiality, one would have to judge first that some human being has a right to have his or her interests fulfilled and second that
all human beings are (in general) relevantly similar. Since such additions do not follow directly from the principle in question and do
not seem to be matters of logic, one can, without being inconsistent
or irrational, affirm the principle of universalizability yet deny the
principle of impartiality. (Nielsen reaches the same conclusion as a
result of analysing Paul Taylor’s claim that from the principle of universalizability one can derive the following principle of impartiality:
‘Ifit is wrong for another to discriminate against him (the agent) on
the ground of a difference he (the agent) does not acknowledge to
be relevant, it must also be wrong for him (the agent) to discriminate
against another on the ground of a difference the other does not accept as relevant.’)
The upshot, at least if Nielsen is correct, is that doubt has been thrown
on the rationalist strategy of using an apparently formal principle as a
foundation on which to base substantive moral principles.
The papers by Olafson and Gorr are concerned with this general upshot of Nielsen’s paper. Both papers consider the use of universalizability as a formal foundation (or at least as part of one), on which to
base substantive moral principles.
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As we have already noted, although Hare and Singer seem to disagree over the correct account or justification of the principle of ethical consistency, they do agree that this principle admits of a “logical”
justification—one that makes essential reference to the logic of moral
terms (see e.g., Singer, 1961, p. 34, and Hare, 1963, p. 30). We have also
just noted Nielsen’s argument that from such a formal, logically based
principle, either alone or together with considerations of logic a.nd rationality, it is not possible to derive any substantive moral principles
or judgments. In particular he argues that it is not possible to derive a
principle of impartiality. The paper by Frederick Olafson, ‘Reflections
on a Passage in Mill’s Utilitarianism,’ offers an account of the principle
in question that stands in sharp contrast to these views of Hare, Singer,
and Nielsen.
Beginning with a suggestive passage from Mill’s Utilitarianism,
Olafson is concerned to defend a certain thesis concerning our allegedly rationally based commitment to a principle of impartiality
(or what Olafson calls ‘intersubjective reciprocity’). According to
Olafson, “Mill’s argument appears to postulate a direct connection
between our social natures and a relationship to at least some other
human beings in which we acknowledge an operative equivalence
between their situation and our own.” Olafson’s elaboration of this
argument in Mill goes as follows. We are essentially social creatures
having a “social nature” involving, among other things, entering into
agreements (both explicit and implicit) with other human beings.
Such agreements presuppose “a set of conceptual instruments that
function in a neutral manner as far as differences between persons
and their points of view are concerned.” This implies that in cases
of conflicting interests, we must at least implicitly acknowledge the
idea that, in general, no one person’s interests occupy a special or
privileged position. In other words, reflecting on our social natures
reveals that we implicitly if not explicitly assent to the idea that, generally, the interests of all human beings are to be weighed equally.
Therefore, a person who, as Olafson explains, takes or tries to take
an egocentric point of view failing to weigh interests equally, “will
not be able to persist in this course of conduct without feeling the
strain of contradiction within the policies by which that conduct is
governed.” Thus, all conduct involving interpersonal transactions is
governed by a set of presuppositions that make any social interaction possible, one of which is that of according equal weight to the
interests of others. An egocentric line of conduct, however, denies
this presupposition.
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The relevance of all this for ethical universalizability, as Olafson
explains, is that if we consider this principle in the “true context of
ethical reflection ... that of an ethical community in which human beings stand to one another in determinate relationships that register
the actual needs and circumstances and multiple forms of interdependency that in fact characterize our lives ... the requirement of universalizability is not simply an isolated logical thesis but widens into an
immensely intricate and powerful dialectic of actions and persons.”
Thus, Olafson might agree with Nielsen that if we consider the principle of universalizability on its own as a logical thesis, then there is
no contradiction involved in assenting to it yet denying a principle of
impartiality. After all, as Nielsen points out, neither the principle itself
nor considerations of logic and rationality entail the crucial judgment
that all human beings are relevantly similar. However, analysis of “the
pragmatic context” reveals that in general no one person’s interests
occupy a position of privilege vis-à-vis the interests of others, i.e., in
general all human beings are relevantly similar when it comes to the
satisfaction of their interests. This condition is a requirement that we
are bound to accept on pain of contradiction, and, together with considerations of universalizability, it entails a principle of impartiality:
In general, the interests of all other human beings are to be weighed
equally. Thus, it is Olafson’s contention that when interpreted in the
proper context, and not simply as a logical thesis, the principle of universalizability does entail substantive conclusions.
In some of his recent writings, including Moral Thinking: Its Levels,
Point and Method, R. M. Hare has attempted to accomplish what Nielsen argues cannot be done, viz., go from considerations of universalizability (together with non-moral principles of rationality) to a substantive moral principle. Hare’s view is that “the requirement to universalize’ our prescriptions generates utilitarianism” (Hare, 1981, p. 11).
In ‘Reason, Impartiality and Utilitarianism,’ Michael Gorr investigates
the connection in Hare’s work between ‘universal prescriptivism’ (the
name generally given to Hare’s metaethical views) and utilitarianism.
Hare’s argument for a kind of preference utilitarianism based on two
formal properties of singular moral judgments—universalizability and
prescriptivity—is roughly the following. The formal or logical properties of universalizability and prescriptivity impose certain formal rules
for reasoning from the moral point of view. In particular, such features
require what Gorr calls the “full reversibility test.” That is, in judging
from the point of view of morality one is to determine whether one
can prescribe acting in accordance with a universal principle which,
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as Gorr explains, involves determining “whether one would actually
choose to perform that action if one knew that one would have to play,
in a series of possible worlds otherwise identical to the actual world,
the role of each person (including oneself) who would be affected.”
Furthermore, one is not “simply to imagine oneself with one’s own
interests, in the place of other persons,” but, rather, to imagine “having in turn their interests and desires.” This thoroughgoing impartiality requirement taken together with a Bayesian account of rationality
entails the claim that a rational and fully informed universal prescriber
would inevitably adopt and act on utilitarian principles. So, on Gorr’s
reconstruction, Hare’s argument is this.
1.
2.
3.

4.

A rational person will always seek to maximize his expected
utility. (Bayesian principle)
Utility = preference satisfaction.
Adopting the moral point of view is equivalent to deciding
how to act as if one had (or were going to have) all the preferences of all those who would be affected by one’s action. (Full
Reversibility Test)
Therefore, a rational person who adopts the moral point of
view will always seek to maximize the total expected utility
of the group of all persons who would be affected by his action.

This move from universal prescriptivism to utilitarianism via the full
reversibility test is, of course, hard to reconcile with Hare’s well-known
claim in Freedom and Reason that the thesis of universal prescriptivism is
“normatively neutral” in the sense that it does not entail any moral theory or principle. However, as Gorr points out, there are traces of Hare’s
more recent views on the matter in Freedom and Reason, and, in the first
part of his paper, Gorr suggests an explanation of why, in that earlier
book, Hare held apparently inconsistent views on the question of the
normative neutrality of universal prescriptivism. His suggestion is that
there are two interpretations of the full reversibility test to be found in
Hare’s earlier writings (the “in propria persona” and “ideal observer”
interpretations) which Hare did not clearly distinguish and which led
him to opposing views on the normative significance of his metaethical
views. What Gorr points out is that, in Moral Thinking, Hare has made
clear that he now accepts the second interpretation of the full reversibility test and that this in effect ensures that principles chosen by rational
and informed universal prescribers will be utility maximizing.
In the remaining sections of his paper, Gorr considers the plausibility of Hare’s view that such a strong impartialism is constitutive of
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morality (premise 3 of the above argument) and argues for the following claims: (1) The contention that a person might be motivated
by a desire to be fully impartial is incapable of a non-circular explication; (2) Hare’s claim that a strong impartiality condition is a formal
requirement of morality is counterintuitive; and (3) Hare’s metaethical
theory does not entail such a strong impartiality requirement. If Gorr’s
objections go through, serious doubt has been cast on Hare’s attempt
to go from metaethical considerations concerning the logic of moral
judgments (particularly the principle of universalizability) together
with constraints on rationality to a substantive moral principle.
We have claimed that the principle under consideration is nonsubstantive in the sense that it does not alone (or even together with
non-moral judgments) entail any substantive moral judgments. But to
say this is not to say or even imply that this principle is useless or
pointless or inapplicable in the context of practical moral issues.4 Its
use in such a context is illustrated by William Lycan in ‘Abortion and
the Civil Rights of Machines.’ In fact it is one of Lycan’s main contentions that an argument based on universalizability considerations is
perhaps the best we may be able to do in making headway on the
abortion issue. Lycan begins by claiming that because the fetus is a being of a “uniquely exceptional sort,” we have no clear intuitions about
the putative rights of such beings. Moreover, no further analysis of
personhood or further fact finding is going to help us move closer to
clarifying our intuitions on this matter. Thus, Lycan proposes that we
explore this issue via a rather indirect route that involves reflecting on
the status and rights of certain sorts of hypothetical machines. Lycan’s
proposed exploration proceeds roughly as follows.
Assuming that a materialist account of human beings is correct (that
human beings have only physical attributes among their irreducible
attributes) and in addition that it is technologically possible to (someday) construct a machine—a robot—that not only looks but behaves
like an ordinary human being, Lycan claims that we could justifiably
infer that such beings were conscious. Of course, given that consciousness of a certain complexity (involving certain cognitive and conative
capacities) is sufficient for personhood, Lycan concludes that such
sophisticated machines would be clear cases of persons. Lycan then
goes on to consider the case of certain hypothetical machines—“protomachines”—which do not yet possess those conceptual and conative
capacities that are morally significant, but which are of a “highly individual basic design (which determines the personality it will have
when it is finished).” We are to consider further the hypothetical case of
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the proto-machine plugged into a “fully developed” mother machine
and “ask whether it would be wrong for the technician to interrupt
the mother-robot’s activity at an early stage (with its concurrence if it
is a person), unplug the proto-machine from the mother, take it off the
workbench and dismantle it.” Lycan reports no feelings of disapproval
at the technician’s actions and argues that since the proto-machine and
the fetus appear to be relevantly similar, then by the principle of universalizability, we may conclude that at least early on in fetal development there is nothing morally wrong with aborting the fetus.5
KANTIAN UNIVERSALIZABILITY
The “universal law” formulation of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative has already been cited in two different versions as Principles
3 and 4 near the beginning of this introduction. It was noted there that
Kant made just about the most ambitious possible claim for this version
of a universalizability principle, viz., that it is “the supreme principle
of morality.” Kant’s view has been enormously controversial since it
was first proposed, and issues of its interpretation and of its correctness have each generated an immense literature. The provocativeness
of Kant’s claim is added to by the fact that he believes that the principle is in no way a consequentialist one; he condemns all teleological,
and hence all consequentialist views as “heteronomous” theories of
morality. The papers in the present volume that center upon explicit
discussions of Kantian universalizability are three. Onora O’Neill defends Kant’s claims. George Nakhnikian finds them (and just about
any other substantive universalizability principle) lacking. And Jonathan Harrison attempts a rapprochement between the historically hostile Kantian and utilitarian views; his paper could have been placed
with equal appropriateness in either the section on Kantian or the one
on consequentialist generalization.
The essay entitled ‘Consistency in Action’ by Onora O’Neill is a defense of the Kantian first formulation of the categorical imperative. She
begins her essay (as does Nakhnikian) with an extended discussion of
the Kantian concept of ‘“maxim.” This is surely a key move for any
would-be defender of Kant, for in the Kantian concept of the maxim as
the formulation of the inner principle of action is where we find hope,
if anywhere, of replying to objections that actions can be described in
an indefinitely large variety of ways for the purpose of universalizing
them. Any given individual action can be made to turn out to possess
the quite different and incompatible moral qualities depending on the
description one arbitrarily chooses to universalize. The idea is that the
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maxim state a fundamental description under which the agent performs the action and this, at least when it can be formulated clearly and
uniquely, provides the correct description of the action for the purposes
of moral evaluation. O’Neill also makes the point that for Kant the primary moral quality of any action is an inner one of moral worth rather
than an outward one of conformity with the requirements of external
action. O’Neill, like Nakhnikian, emphasizes that there is a variety of
ways in which maxims can be impossible or self-defeating prior to any
consideration of their potential universalizability; but such difficulties
must be cleared aside before a properly moral evaluation of the maxim
can even begin. O’Neill states the intuitive idea behind the categorical
imperative as being that” ... if we are to act as morally worthy beings we
should not single ourselves out for special consideration or treatment”
(p. 172). Actions which the universality test shows wrong are shown to
result when we attempt to universalize acts or practices such as deception, coercion, and abrogation of autonomy. She states that much of
the anti-Kantian literature here assumes that it is possible to state the
proposed maxim of action in such a way that the action is described in
quite a narrow fashion; but her earlier discussion of the nature of maxims has undercut this objection. The kinds of inconsistencies involved
in Kant’s “contradiction in the will” examples are also discussed. A
point that is emphasized throughout O’Neill’s essay is that Kant is not
some sort of generalized utilitarian; the latter sort of view would be,
according to Kant’s terminology, a heteronomous moral theory. “The
interest of an autonomous universality test is that it aims to ground
an ethical theory on notions of consistency and rationality rather than
upon consideration of desire and preference” (p. 182).
In a lengthy and thorough essay, George Nakhnikian considers very
seriously the claim of the first formulation of the categorical imperative (“K1”) to be what Kant calls it, “the supreme principle of morality,” and finally rejects the claim. He looks with more favor upon the
second formulation, which draws moral consequences from the fact
that human beings are to be regarded as absolute ends who are not
to be treated as mere means, and the third, “kingdom-of-ends” formulation which mentions as essential the peer status of moral agentlegislator-subjects. But our main interest in the present discussion is in
Nakhnikian’s thesis that “K1 does not work” (p.189).
As we consider this claim more closely we find that what Nakhnikian has to say has an interest quite far beyond issues of the exegesis
of Kant. From its Kantian beginnings, his discussion becomes a much
broader and more general discussion of the possible modes of univer-
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salizability, in a sense attempting to cover the range of possible universalizability theses in the same thorough way that Narveson does,
though as it turns out the possibilities that he discusses are mostly
rather different from those discussed by Narveson. Thus for example,
he discusses logically and physically impossible practical situations,
and physically possible practical situations that cannot be universally
practiced, and those that can be, but that in various ways we could not
will to be universal practice.
The difficulties that Naknikian finds in Kantian and related versions
of universalizability revolve around a set of counterexamples first
stated on pp. 202-203, those of patenting an invention, visiting a sick
friend in the hospital, publishing Icelandic jokes in a journal, and lying
only in cases where no-one will find out.
Many discussions of universalizability criteria of morality have been
carried on in terms of alleged counterexamples. Marcus Singer’s Generalization in Ethics (1961) mentions a wealth of such proposed counterexamples and attempts to respond to them, and a fair amount of the
literature discussing Kant on the application of the categorical imperative does the same. There is a large literature discussing Kant’s famous
four examples in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), the
arguments for the wrongness of suicide, making a lying promise,
and the obligation to develop one’s talents and to render aid to another. These are not “counterexamples” to universalizability, at least
certainly not so far as Kant’s intentions were concerned! But Kant’s
application arguments have seemed to a number of writers either so
inadequate or so obscure that for these people they have come to be regarded as counterexamples to Kant’s claim to be able to apply the first
formulation (the “universalizability” formulation) to moral situations
to obtain unique correct answers to the question “Is an action of sort S
morally correct or not?”
Nakhnikian sees his proposed counterexamples as not just showing the first formulation of the categorical imperative to be seriously
defective. His conclusion is more general: it is that any such universalizability criterion must exhibit the same defects, must fall to the same
counterexamples. Such scepticism about purely “formal” criteria of
morality dates back at least to Hegel, who has some of his own proposed counterexamples.
On the other hand there also seems to be a perennial attractiveness
about some concepts of universalizability, for they have their defenders today, as can be seen by examining the contributions to the present
anthology by Narveson, O’Neill, and Singer, among others.
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The counterexamples that Nakhnikian proposes call for further detailed discussion, something that is beyond the scope of this introduction. One large class of counterexamples to Kantian universalizability
deal with the alleged arbitrariness of the deSCription of actions for
the purpose of moral evaluation. Singer’s discussion of the concepts
of “invertibility” and “reiterability” in Generalization in Ethics (1961)
is one important attempt to deal with this problem. Potter (1973) also
discusses this issue in its Kantian context. There are no doubt also other classes of counterexamples that result from other kinds of problems
with universalizability, such as questions about the relevance or irrelevance of the wants, wishes, or likely actions of others. (Is it right
to perform an action that is such that if many performed it, we could
not accept the consequences, just in case very few others are likely
to want to perform such an action? Is it obligatory to render aid to
another when others are failing to do their part in rendering aid, and
this makes it either likely or certain that my own attempt to render aid
will be unsuccessful?) Another kind of issue arises when we are considering cases of actions based on false beliefs, a kind of case that Kant
never mentions, and still different cases arise from puzzles concerning
competition, in which, necessarily, not everyone can win (O’Neill discusses these in her paper).
CONSEQUENTIALIST UNIVERSALIZABILITY
As has already been remarked, the paper by Jonathan Harrison,
though placed by us in the division on consequentialism could equally well have been placed in the section on Kantian universalizability.
Harrison’s main aim is to show that there are large areas of agreement between Kantians and utilitarians, and in particular that many of
Kant’s criticisms of teleological ethics do not apply as sound criticisms
to utilitarianism.
The version of utilitarianism that Harrison defends is a version he calls
“cumulative effect utilitarianism,” to distinguish it from rule utilitarianism, and a kind of “ideal” utilitarianism which is prepared to allow that
Kantian moral virtue might be something good in itself, an admission
that would of course be incompatible with the hedonism of classical
utilitarianism. Here are some of the Kantian objections that in Harrison’s
view do not have proper application to utilitarianism: (1) Kant thought
that teleological theories all appeal to the agent’s own inclination, but
utilitarianism, which demands that we seek for the good of all, does not.
We are not likely to have an inclination to bring about the good of all,
and it is also clear that our having the utilitarian obligation does not pre-
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suppose our having the inclination. (2) It is quite possible and reasonable
to develop a version of utilitarianism which does not have the rightness
or wrongness of acts depend on actual consequences, but instead has
such moral qualities of acts depend on intended consequences and the
qualities of character which tend to produce certain kinds of facts. Such
a version of utilitarianism is closer to Kant’s view. (3) Kant thought that
duty, as a modal notion, implied a kind of necessity, and he thought that
teleological ethics was incompatible with morality properly conceived.
Harrison in response tries to sort out the kinds of necessity which moral
judgments do and do not have, mentioning some of the possible confusions that may arise concerning such issues. He concludes that Kant
may have been guilty of certain confusions, and that in any case Harrison’s version of utilitarianism is not incompatible with the proper kinds
of necessity attaching to moral judgments.
Meanwhile, Harrison does have some criticisms of Kant: (1) He thinks
that Kant exaggerated the goodness of good will. Even if it is allowed as
a good in itself, it is not the only good in itself, nor is its good infinitely
greater than other kinds of goodness. (2) On the matter of greatest interest in this anthology Harrison says that Kant’s universal law formulation
of the categorical imperative marks “the point at which utilitarianism
has to be modified in order to fulfill Kant’s requirements.” The modification arises in cases such as promise-keeping, where the utilitarian
would recommend failing to keep promises in certain individual cases;
if such recommendations were commonly followed by bad consequences—the cumulative consequences of a large number of promise-breakings—would follow. So the individual is well advised not to follow the
utilitarian’s advice, not because his maxim would be self defeating if
universalized (this fact has no relevance to the moral quality of the act
in Harrison’s view), but because there would be bad consequences. Harrison recognizes that this point does not quite mean that he is accepting
Kants first formulation, but he thinks it comes rather close.
The papers by Cork and Gillespie concern Marcus Singer’s generalization argument:
If everyone were to do that, the consequences would be undesirable,
therefore no one ought to do that.

The principle corresponding to this argument,
If the consequences of everyone’s doing that would be undesirable,
then no one ought to do that

functions in Singer’s theory as the supreme moral principle and thus
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“serves as a test or criterion of the morality of conduct, and provides
the basis for moral rules” (Singer, 1961, p. 9).
Now Singer offers an argument or deduction of this principle (GA,
hereafter) of the following sort.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

If the consequences of A’s doing x would be undesirable, then
A ought not to do x. (The principle of consequences, C.)
If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesir
able, then not everyone ought to do x. (The generalization
from the principle of consequences, GC.)
If not everyone ought to do x, then no one ought to do x. (The
generalization principle, GP.)
Therefore, if the consequences of everyone’s doing x would
be undesirable, then no one ought to do x. (GA.)

Premise (2) is said to be a generalization from (1) –the latter taken to be
necessary—and (4) is supposed to follow from (2) and (3).
This argument has been the subject of a good deal of criticism, perhaps the most common being the so-called ‘collective-distributive’ criticism which can be explained as follows. The term ‘everyone’ can be
construed collectively as referring to the whole of a class of (relevantly
similar) agents or distributively as referring to each and every particular
member of that class. Accordingly, GC admits of two interpretations
depending on how ‘everyone’ is understood in the consequent.
If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesirable, then
it ought to be that someone not do x. (The collective interpretation.)
If the consequences of everyone’s doing x would be undesirable, then
there is someone who ought not to do x. (The distributive interpretation.)

The problem is this. On the collective interpretation, the argument is
invalid since as Singer makes clear ‘everyone’ in the antecedent of GP
(Premise 4) is to be read distributively. However, on the distributive
interpretation, GC is susceptible to counterexamples of the following
sort. Although if no one stands guard duty on a particular occasion,
the consequences would be undesirable, it does not follow that there js
someone about whom we could say that he ought to stand guard duty
and could be punished for not doing so (Nakhnikian, 1964, p. 446)
Charles M. Cork, in his ‘The Deontic Structure of the Generalization
Argument’, develops a formalized version of Singer’s argument that
attempts to avoid this collective-distributive problem. His new version
involves an analysis of the consequent of GC (‘it ought to be the case that
someone not do x’) that allows a transition to a distributive claim about
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the members of the relevant set of agents but “not to those flesh and
blood relevantly similar agents ... to whom we can point, but to logical
constructions of agents (blanks, as it were), into which the former can
be filled ....” In other words, instead of distributing the collective obligation to avoid undesirable consequences to identifiable persons (which
then raises the embarrassing question of who is forbidden to perform
the action in question), on Cork’s analysis, such obligation is distributed
to “arbitrary members of a set, .. defined here as those about whom we
make no assumptions other than their membership in the set.”
If successful, Cork’s analysis of this argument not only solves the
collective-distributive problem but helps make clear how the various
alleged counterexamples to the generalization argument can be handled by Singer’s theory.
Antecedent to the publication of David Lyons’ Forms and Limits of
Utilitarianism, it was generally thought that so-called general utilitarianism (a label used to characterize Singer’s generalization argument)
was immune to certain apparently devastating criticisms besetting
analogous forms of simple or act utilitarianism. The claim was that a
principle like Singer’s is able to account for our obligations concerning
generally accepted moral rules that are troublesome on the act utilitarian view. This alleged difference between analogous forms of these
two sorts of theory was challenged by Lyons who argued persuasively that despite appearances, analogous forms of simple and general utilitarianism are really extensionally equivalent—they yield the
same substantive judgments when applied to the same cases. In other
words, according to Lyons once we bring into consideration all of the
relevant facts and utilities bearing on a particular case, “it matters not
whether we ask ‘What would happen if everyone did the same?’ instead of ‘What would happen if this act were performed?,’” (Lyons,
1965, p. 119), the results of these two tests will be the same.
Our final article, Norman Gillespie’s ‘Moral Reasons and the Generalization Test in Ethics’, concerns Lyons’ extensional equivalence
thesis. In particular, Gillespie considers Lyons’ explanation of the relevance of the behavior of others in describing actions for purposes of
applying the generalization test which is the key to the reductive thesis. Gillespie distinguishes two readings of the generalization test—the
de dicto and the de re—and argues that it is Lyons’ de dicto reading of the
test that leads him to mistaken conclusions about the relevance of the
behavior of others in applying the test. According to Gillespie, once
the test is interpreted de re, which “is the appropriate one for capturing
its moral force,” we can see not only that the extensional equivalence
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thesis fails but that the test is not strictly utilitarian. In fact, as Gillespie
explains, “The moral point of the generalization test in ethics is not that
your act will, either incidentally or as part of a general practice, produce undesirable consequences, but that it is unfair.”
CONCLUSION
The aim of the present volume is to show that recent philosophical
thought on universalizability is multifaceted and alive, and is making advances. This has been done by presenting a wide variety of work by authors who are among the best of those currently working on these issues.
This introduction has aimed to present the main points of our authors in
summary form, exhibiting some of their relationships to each other.
Now that we have briefly discussed the papers included here it can
be seen that they each have an important role to play in further discussions of this general topic. The pieces by Singer, Gillespie, and Cork
discuss and reassess one of the major works on this aspect of moral
philosophy, Singer’s own Generalization in Ethics. O’Neill, Nakhnikian,
and Harrison take views each opposed to the other on the interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s view on universalizability. Kant is surely the
single most important historical writer on this topic in ethics. Michael
Gorr takes up a recent important new work by another major contemporary figure in the literature of universalizability, the man who created the term, R. M. Hare. Nielsen considers (and rejects) connections
with the seemingly related concept of impartiality. Lycan considers a
problem arising in the application of certain universalizability principles, viz., that some kinds of moral issues seem to be unique, and
thus, frustratingly, to allow of no clearcut moral analogies with other
issues that could be used to alleviate our moral perplexity. Rabinowicz
discusses a closely related issue that is also discussed in various ways
by O’Neill and others, the problem of how to interpret the universalizability principle so as to avoid the Scylla of the banal useless truism,
and the Charybdis of an unuseable notion of “ethical relevance.” The
issue is that of the relativity of descriptions of action that are to be
evaluated morally, the multiplicity of available descriptions, and the
seeming arbitrariness of choosing one description over another.
The essay by Frederick Olafson, which chooses as its text an interesting and neglected passage from an important classic of moral philosophy, J. S. Mill’s Utilitarianism, illustrates the ways in which utilitarian
and deontological themes often intermingle in discussions of universalizability. The same point is illustrated in different ways in the work here
by Harrison, Gillespie, and Narveson. “Unfairness” considerations are
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surely best understood as nonconsequentialist if not Kantian in their appeal. The fact that (if Gillespie is correct) Singer’s theory, which has been
taken by most readers to be consequentialist, contains, when properly
understood, an important appeal to the deontological characteristic of
“unfairness” illustrates the complex interplay of consequentialist and
Kantian moral characteristics which we have also seen in other papers.
In fact it is often difficult to discern when a conception of universalizability is purely consequentialist as opposed to when it contains appeals only to deontological elements. Likewise it is sometimes difficult
to discern whether a universalizability principle is merely “logical”
and hence nonsubstantive, or whether it may in fact have some important element of extra-logical substance.
The distinctions on which we based the organization of this volume
of essays, though important ones, are often overlooked or overridden
by actual philosophical practice. This present introduction is not intended as a brief for philosophical purity with respect to such distinctions. The common presence of “impurity” surely reflects something
important about the moral phenomena that are under discussion.
There is no common theme or new consensus that emerges from this
collection. Any attempt to achieve consensus or to unify under a common theme is surely premature. In no case, we think, does an essay
in this collection resolve and thereby close off further philosophical
discussion. The usefulness of the essays is much more likely to lie in a
different direction—in the direction of providing advances upon previous current discussion and thereby not closing off but rather opening up these issues and providing a stimulus to further discussion.
NOTES
1

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Ostwald translation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1962, p. 118), Book V, Chapter 3, 1131a13-23).
2 An even more radical thesis would be that of giving the treatment that will yield
equal results (compensating equality). For a discussion of this sort of equality see
Onora O’Neill s essay, ‘Opportunities, Equalities, and Education’ (Theory and Decision, 7 275-295, October 1976).
3 Without involving ourselves in the task of defining what counts as a consequentialist moral theory or principle, suffice it to say that we are using the term in a
general way intended to cover utilitarians of all varieties as well as, e.g., Singer’s
theory which, as he correctly insists, is not, strictly speaking, utilitarian (see Singer, 1977).
4 On this point see Sid B. Thomas (1968).
5 As Lycan admits, the analogy here needs some adjusting which he attempts to
supply and, moreover, this particular argument is only persuasive (if at all) when
considering the proto-machine at an early stage of construction development.

